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ILLINOIS NATIONAL INSURANCE COMPANY v. ROSE:
SUBSEQUENT INSOLVENCY OF AN INSURER AND ITS
EFFECT UNDER AN UNINSURED MOTORIST
PROVISION
INTRODUCTION

Insurance coverage under an uninsured motorist clause provides financial compensation to the innocent victim of an automobile accident in which the negligent party was either uninsured
and financially unable to respond in damages, or the accident was
a hit-and-run. The innocent party was recompensed by his own
insurer under the terms of the insurance contract.
The General Assembly of Illinois, in 1963, amended the Insurance Act. The amended act 1 required that no policy of insurance would be issued or delivered in this state with respect
to any motor vehicle garaged in this state unless coverage was
provided up to the statutory requirements against owners or operators of uninsured motor vehicles and hit-and-run motor vehicles.
In 1967, another amendment 3 was enacted which, among
1 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 73, §755a (1963), as amended, ILL. REV. STAT.
ch. 73, §755a (1) (1967).
On and after the effective date of this amendatory Act of 1963, no
policy insuring against loss resulting from liability imposed by law
for bodily injury or death suffered by any person arising out of the
ownership, maintenance or use of a motor vehicle shall be delivered
or issued for delivery in this state with respect to any motor vehicle
registered or principally garaged in this state unless coverage is provided
therein or supplemental thereto, in limits for bodily injury or death
set forth in Section 7-203 of the "Illinois Motor Vehicle Law", approved
July 11, 1957, as heretofore and hereafter amended, for the protection
of persons insured thereunder who are legally entitled to recover
damages from owners or operators of uninsured motor vehicles and hitand-run motor vehicles because of bodily injury, sickness or disease, including death, resulting therefrom, except that the named insured shall
have the right to reject' such coverage, and except that, unless the named
insured requests such coverage in writing, such coverage need not be
provided in or supplemental to a renewal policy where the named insured
had rejected the coverage in connection with a policy previously issued
to
him by the same insurer.
. 2 ILL. REV. STAT. ch.
95 , §7A-203 (1969).
In order for a motor vehicle insurance policy or bond to be effective in
this state the statute provides minimum limits of coverage. The minimum
limits of coverage are $10,000 to any one person killed or injured, $20,000
for any two persons killed or injured in any one accident, and not less than
$5,000 because of injury or destruction of property.
3 ILL. REy. STAT. ch. 73, §755a (2)
(1967), amending, ILL. REV. STAT.
ch. 73, §755a (1963).
For the purpose of this coverage the term "uninsured motor vehicle"
includes, subject to the terms and conditions of such coverage, a motor
Vehicle where on, prior to or after the accident date the liability insurer
thereof is unable to make payment with respect to the legal liability of
its insured within the limits specified in the policy because of the entry
by a court of competent jurisdiction of an order of rehabilitation or
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other things, expanded the term "uninsured motor vehicle" to
include the situation where the negligent party's liability insurer

becomes unable to indemnify its insured because of rehabilitation, liquidation or insolvency. 4 However, the amendment was
5
to be applied prospectively only.

Several insurers contracted, prior to the effective date of
the prospective statute, to provide coverage for their insureds
when they were the victims of a hit-and-run accident, or where
the tortfeasor had no insurance coverage applicable at the time
of the accident, or where a tortfeasor was insured but his insurer denied coverage. The issue in Illinois National Insurance
Company v. Rose,6 was whether coverage would be extended under the "denial of coverage" clause of such a policy where the
negligent party's insurer becomes insolvent subsequent to the
accident.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On September 19, 1964, a collision occurred in Peoria, Illinois
between an automobile owned and driven by John P. Rose and
an automobile owned and driven by the alleged tortfeasor, Anna

Jordan.

On November 6, 1964, Rose and his wife Gertrude, a

passenger in the car, commenced a negligence action against Jor-

dan claiming damages in the amount of $7,500 and $45,000 respectively. An appearance was filed on December 31, 1964, on
behalf of the alleged tortfeasor by an attorney for Bell Mutual
Casualty Company, who thereafter failed to defend the lawsuit.
A default judgment was entered.
Rose, on December 11, 1964, gave notice of claim to his in-

surer, the Illinois National Insurance Company, in compliance
with the uninsured motor vehicle provision7 of the policy issued
liquidation by reason of insolvency on or after the accident date. An
insurer's extension of coverage, as provided in this subparagraph, shall
be applicable to all accidents occurring after the effective date of this Act
during a policy period in which its insured's uninsured motor vehicle
coverage is in effect. Nothing in this Section may be construed to
prevent any insurer from extending coverage under terms and conditions
more favorable to its insureds than is required hereunder.
The amendment was the direct result of a tremendous number of insurance
companies going into receivership causing detrimental financial effect to
innocent parties insured by those companies. See, Fitspatrick, Editorial
Note, 54 ILL. B.J. 381-2 (1954).
4 ILL. Rnv. STAT. ch. 73, §799 et. seq. (1967).
A court of competent
Jurisdiction may order the director to take possession of the property
business and affairs, and take such steps towards removal of the causes and
conditions which have made such proceedings necessary as may be expedient.
He may then rehabilitate it or liquidate it depending upon the financial position of the company.
5 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 73, §755a (4) (1967), amending, ILL. Rnv. STAT.
ch. 73 §755a (1963).
6 illinois Nat. Ins. Co. v. Rose, 93 Ill. App. 2d 329, 235 N.E.2d 675
(1968). (Hereinafter cited as Rose.)
Id. at 330, 235 N.E.2d at 676 (1968).
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by his insurer, alleging that "either the alleged tortfeasor . . .
had no liability insurance or that it was being contested.",, On
September 9, 1965, Bell Mutual Casualty Company was declared
insolvent.9
PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On March 24, 1967, a demand for arbitration was made with
the American Arbitration Association on behalf of Rose against
Illinois National Insurance Company, in accordance with the insured's policy.10 Illinois National Insurance Company refused
to submit to arbitration and filed suit for a declaratory judgment
and an injunction to prevent Rose from further pursuing his
demand for arbitration.THE TRIAL COURT'S DECISION

The trial court, after hearing argument and considering
briefs of counsel, concluded that the tortfeasor was insured at
the time of the accident but was denied coverage because of the
subsequent insolvency of tortfeasor's insurer. The issue then

was whether Rose, the innocent victim, could receive compensation under his own policy issued by Illinois National which provided coverage under the uninsured motor vehicle provision.
The policy issued by Illinois National defined "uninsured

automobile" as follows:
An automobile or trailer with respect to the ownership, maintenance or use of which there is in at least the amount specified by
the Financial Responsibility Law of the State in which the insured
automobile is principally garaged, no bodily injury liability bond or
insurance policy applicableat the time of the accident with respect
to any person or organization legally responsible for the use of
such automobile, or with respect to which there is a bodily injury
liability bond or insurance policy applicable at the time of the ac8 Brief for Appellee at 11, Rose.
9 Rose, 93 Ill. App. 2d at 330, 235 N.E.2d at 676 (1968). A recent report
for the United States Department of Transportation rates Illinois as having
the highest number of insolvent domestic insurers in the country. 1970,
Dep't of Transp., Automobile Insurance and Compensation Study, Insol-

vencies Among Automobile Insurers, at 5, n.1.

10 Brief for Appellee at 13-14, Rose. The following provision is a
standard bureau form used by a great many insurers including Illinois
National:
To pay all sums which the insured or his legal representative shall be
legally entitled to recover as damages from the owner or operator of an
uninsured automobile because of bodily injury, sickness or disease, including death, resulting therefrom, herein called 'bodily injury', sustained by the insured, caused by accident and arising out of ownership,
maintenance or use of such uninsured automobile; provided, for the
purpose of this coverage, determination as to whether the insured or such
representative is legally entitled to recover such damages, and if so, the
amount thereof, shall be made by agreement between the insured or such
representative and the company or, if they fail to agree, by arbitration.
(Emphasis added.)
11 Brief for Appellee at 14, Rose,
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cident but the company writing the same denies coverage ithereunder.1 2

The trial court held that the subsequent insolvency of the tortfeasor's insurer was tantamount to denial of coverage under
the policy issued by Illinois National. Thus, the court held that
the uninsured motorist provision was applicable to the situation
where tortfeasor's insurer becomes insolvent. Plaintiff's prayer
for an injunction was denied.13
THE INSURER'S THEORY ON APPEAL

The plaintiff-appellant's theory of the case was based on a
determination of. the words "denial of coverage." Illinois National argued that "denial of coverage" was limited to affirmative acts of the tortfeasor's insurer based upon conduct of the
insured tortfeasor."' Illinois National relied on the Pennsylvania
Appellate Court's decision in Pattaniv. Keystone Insurance Company,15 -which contained the exact same factual situation. The

Pennsylvania statute16 required all insurance companies issuing
automobile liability insurance policies within the Commonwealth
to provide, as part of the protection, coverage for the damages
caused by uninsured owners and uninsured operators of motor
vehicles. The -Pennsylvania statute, identical to the Illinois
statute, 7 failed to define uninsured motorist. However, the insurance policy in Pattani I contained an uninsured motorist
clause identical to the one in the policy issued to Rose.' 8 SimiJ2!Btief- for Appellee at 14,. Rose. (Emphasis, added.)
Earlier bureau
policies.as in.Dreher.v. Aetna Casualty_& Surety Co. 83 Ill. App. 2d 141, 143,
226 N.E2d 287,. 288 (1967) defined 'uninsured motor vehicle" as follows:
. . an automobile with respect to the owfiership, "maintenance or'use of
which' there is'no bodily injury liability bond or insurance policy applicable at the time of' the accident with respect to any person or organization -legally -responsible 'for,the use of such automobile.
(Emphasis
supplied [by the court].)
, I
That court specially held under the above definition of "uninsured 'motorist"
that a person insured at the time of the accident does not become uninsured
because his insurance company becomes insolvent; and such insolvency does
not relate back to the time of the accident. In the later policies, as in Rose,
the ifisurer voluntarily extended coverage to include an uninsured motor
v.ehicle, one with respect to which a policy was applicable at the time of
the accident but coverage under such policy was denied.
In the Dreher decision, the court 'recognized the significance of the
phrase 'where the insured denies coverage thereunder.' It also noted that
egislation had been proposed to alleviate the problem.
.' 3 Brief for Appellee at 15-16, Rose.
14 Appellant's Brief at 12-13, Rose.
'5 Pattani v. Keystone Ins. Co., consolidated With Levy v. Keystone Ins.
Co., 209 Pa. Super. 15, 223 A.2d 899 (1966), rev'd sub nom, Pattani' v. Keystone Ins. Co. 426 Pa. 332, 231 A.2d 402 (1967) ; Levy v. Keystone Ins. Co.
426 Pa. 340, 231 A.2d 406 (1967).
Plaintiff-appellant relies on the appellate court decision, hereinafter
referred to as Pattani I; defendant-appellee relies on the supreme court
decision, hereinafter referred to as PattaniII.
16 Laws of Pennsylvania, Act of August 14, 1963, P.L. 909, §1, 40
P.S. §2000.
17

See note 1.

18 See text at note 12.
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larly, the tortfeasor was denied coverage because of his insurer's subsequent insolvency.
In PattaniI, the court reasoned that "in light of the reasons
behind uninsured motorist coverage and especially the legislative
concern which resulted in the Act of 1963, a liberal construction
should be given to any such provision in an insurance policy."' 19
Furthermore, any ambiguity in a contract of insurance is to be
20
construed in favor of the insured and against the insurer.
However, the court could find no ambiguity in the contract and
could not expand the definition of the uninsured motorist as
2
provided in the contract of insurance to the facts of the case. 1
The court said, "denial of coverage means a rejection of the
policyholder as an insured and a refusal to accord him the protection he contracted for. It does not mean inability to collect
the full amount of the damages from the insurer. '' 22 The court
declared that denial of coverage contemplates affirmative action
by the insurance company and that a decree of liquidation by a
court of competent jurisdiction or the appointment of a receiver
is not affirmative action by the company denying coverage. 2 ' The
court concluded by acknowledging the detrimental effect upon the
innocent parties but added, "[A]ny broadening of the coverage
provided by such insurance must ... be the result of legislation
19

PattaniI, 209 Pa. Super. 15, 19-20, 223 A.2d 899, 901 (1966).
Id. at 19, 223 A.2d at 901.
21
Id. at 20, 223 A.2d at 901.
22
20

1d.

Id.
An affirmative act may be defined as a wilful, deliberate or intentional act
which expresses the quality of the conduct of the person guilty of the breach
of contract. Corbin states that the above terms have seldom been defined
in any meaningful way. 3A. CORBIN, CONTRACTS §707 (1960).
In a footnote Corbin refers to Commercial Discount Co. v. Town of
Plainfield, 120 Conn. 274, 180 A. 311 (1935). In that case the court held that
failure to complete performance because of an inability to obtain funds
was not a wilful or affirmative act and therefore not a breach which would
prohibit recovery of quantum meruit. Denial of coverage based upon the
reasoning of the above cited case acquires greater meaning in light of this
interpretation. The following cases seem to define those affirmative or
wilful acts which fulfill the requirement of "denial of coverage" under the
policy issued by Illinois National:
Carroll v. Preferred Risk Ins. Co., 60 Ill. App. 2d 170, 208 N.E.2d 801
(1966), held that failure of prospective applicant for insurance to disclose
facts materially affecting the acceptance of the policy was a violation of the
terms of the policy so that although insurer had accepted the policy, liability
was disclaimed for failure of the condition of notice. This was an effective
denial of coverage and was covered by the innocent victim's uninsured
motorist provision as an effective denial of coverage.
In McDanield v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 205 Va. 815, 139 S.E.2d
806 (1965), plaintiff was allowed recovery under the uninsured motorist
provision where tortfeasor's insurer denied coverage because of tortfeasor's
failure to cooperate in the preparation for trial.
St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co. v. Am. Arb. Ass'n, 425 Pa. 548, 229 A.2d 858
(1967) held that where tortfeasor's insurer unequivocally indicated that it
had denied coverage under the policy, this was sufficient to fulfill the unin23

sUrdd motorist provision.

Buck v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 265 N.C. 285, 144 S.E.2d
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or contractual bargaining, and not by this court."' ,
Illinois National argued that it did not contract to be guarantor of every other insurance company, nor was it required by
the statute then applicable. " The policy issued by Illinois National, it alleged, was designed to protect the insured from the
occurrence of ordinary accidents equal to or in excess of the
statutory limit (dependent on premiums paid), plus where the
party at fault had no insurance at the time of the accident, or the
party at fault was subject to a policy defense, for example, where
coverage was denied because of some action by the insured.2
Illinois National noted that the policy issued to Rose was
not a standard bureau policy.2 71 The policy issued by Illinois National extended coverage to include incidents which fulfill the
policy defense clause allowing tortfeasor's insurer to "refuse to
recognize or acknowledge ... responsibility' ' 28 or, in the policy's
terms, "deny coverage" because of some failure of the insured
to fulfill the terms of the policy. National argued that this did
not contemplate insolvency of the insurer.
Finally, Illinois National argued that Rose at all times had
total coverage in accordance with their contract.2 9 Neither upon
the payment of the premiums by Rose, nor upon the acceptance of
that payment by Illinois National did either party contemplate
or intend that the contract would protect the insured from insolvency of tortfeasor's insurer. Therefore, the contract does
not. permit the straining of plain and unambiguous language to
create ambiguity where none exists as to the terms of the contract. 0
THE INSURED'S THEORY ON APPEAL

In answer, the defendant-appellee's theory was based upon
the legislative purpose of the 1963 Insurance Act 31 and a construction of the insurance policy to accomplish the objective
enunciated by the public policy of the state.
Rose contended that the "obvious legislative purpose" of the
34 (1965) held that an employee who was driving his employer's vehicle
without his knowledge, permission or consent was outside the scope of employment, therefore he was not an agent of the owner and was not covered by
the employer-owner's policy and was an uninsured vehicle. The vehicle was

insured but the unauthorized driver was not. This was held an uninsuiwd
vehicle for the purpose of collection under the uninsured motorist clause.
Therefore, in this instance there was no coverage at the time of the accident.
24 PattaniI, 209 Pa. Super. at 21, 223 A.2d at 902.
25 Brief for Appellant at 9, 10, Rose.
26 Brief for Appellant at 13, Rose.

2 See note 12 supra.
28 Appellant's Reply Brief at 5, Rose.

29 Appellant's Reply Brief at 2, Rose.
30 Appellant's Reply Brief at 7, Rose.
31 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 73, §755a (1963), as amended, ILL. REV. STAT.

73, §755a (2) (1967).

ch.
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1963 Act was to establish minimum financial responsibility coverage for protection of persons insured who are legally entitled
to recover damages from the operators of uninsured vehicles because of bodily injury31 The public policy of the state and the
meaning of the statute command that when the tortfeasor's insurance company fails to assume its responsibility under the
existing contract between company and tortfeasor, that tortfeasor is an uninsured motorist. Rose argued:
This public policy is based on the social problem inherent in the
widespread, ever increasing use of the automobile and the consequent rise in automobile created injuries, which in turn, has
induced legislation (sic) action, attempting to assure monetary
compensation for those so injured and thus prevent many of these
injured from becoming public charges due to expenses of medical
and hospital care and family support during convalescence, and the
period their lawsuit is pending.
...The statutory objective is not obtained by giving the insured
a claim against an insolvent.88
Therefore, the injured person's insurance carrier should provide substitute coverage as it contracted for under its uninsured
motor vehicle provision as required by statute. Counsel for Rose
asked, "what 'protection' is afforded the innocent injured insureds... by giving them a claim against an insolvent... when
they would be given uninsured motorist vehicle coverage if tortfeasor ...had no insurance at all ... ?,,34
Rose contended that contracts of insurance must be construed according to the sense and meaning of the terms which
the parties have used and if the provisions limiting liability are
ambiguous or equivocal, then they should be construed most
strongly against the insurer. 35 Furthermore, since the 1963 Act
did not define uninsured motor vehicle, the statute should be interpreted with regard to whether insolvency was a denial of coverage in light of the 1967 amendment.3 6
Rose argued that there was nothing in the letter, spirit, or
purpose of the Insurance Code or the insurance policy that required a denial of coverage to be expressed or to require affirmative action on the part of the tortfeasor's insurer.3 7 Denial of
coverage in any meaningful sense of the term may be effectively
made by voluntary or involuntary conduct of the tortfeasor's
insurer. 8 Therefore, failure to defend or pay claims or satisfy
82 Brief for Appellee at 20, 21. Rose.
83 Id. at 28-29.
34 Id. at 21.
35Id. at 23.

86 Id. at 41.
37M. at 35.
38Id.
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a judgment or otherwise fail to aff6id:the protectio0n it contracted
to,give the insured was a denial of: c0Verage .
.
"
.
Appellee noted that. the Penhisylvania Appellate 'C.6urt case
A
o' which appellant relies, which held -that an affirimative act wag
indispensable to- a "denial. of coverage,": was reversed by the
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.-9
Rose acknowledged that the case was novel in Pennsylvania,
but asserted that the issue had been decided in other jurisdictions.40 The Suprem6.Court of Virginia, in'State Farm Mutual
Insurance Comp&ny V.: Brow er,4 1 held, that the refusal of the insolvent insurance carrier to provide coverage, constituted a denial
of coverage, and that a denial f .coverage clearly may be as effectively made by the conduct of the insurer.as by its spoken or written word. The Supreme Court of South Carolina, in North River
Insurance Company v. Gibson 2 held that the right of the insured
to recover under his uninsured motorist coverageis not necessarily determinable -at the- date of the collision. An insurer
denies coverage to its insured when it fails or refuses to accord
him the protection it contracted to give. The Appellate Court
of California, in Katz v. American Motorist Insurance Cornpany,4 3 held that an insurer who becomes insolvent denies coverage thus the innocent party is entitled to the protection
afforded by the policy written with respect to the uninsured
motorist.
Rose further refuted the contention of Illinois National that
the policy issued by it was broader than the, standard bureau
policy of the insurance industry in 1964. Rose noted that commencing January 1, 1963, the large casualty companies had
broadened their uninsured motorist coverage to include coverage
against hit-and-runs which Illinois National'had not.4 4 .Therefore, Illinois National's policy was not as broad as the 1963 standard family auto policy.
Finally, Rose concluded by relying on the reasoning of the
Pennsylvania, Virginia, South Carolina, and California courts.
39 Id. at 31-32.
The appellate court held that the term "denial of
coverage" was so clear and, unambiguous as to be restricted in its meaning
to only affirmative acts .by the insurer based on conduct of the insured. The
supreme court, on the other hand, held that the term was not so clear and
unambiguous as to be so restrictive in its meaning, but could include any
failure or refusal to provide coverage.
40 Id..at 32.
41 204 Va. 887, 134 S.E.2d 277 (1964).
42 244 S.C. 393;,137 S.E.2d 264 -(1964).
a
4353 Cal. Rptr. 669 (1966).
The Pattani and Rose cases were
identical to the Virginia, South Carolina and California cases except in
Illinois and Pennsylvania the statutes did not define uninsured motor vehicle,
whereas the other state statutes did. However, the policies issued by the
insurer in Rose and Pattani defined uninsured motor vehicle in almost the
exact same terms as the statute in the other states.
44 Brief for Appellee at 19, Rose.
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The defendant argued that the reasoning was sound and consistent with the letter and spirit of the Illinois statute and the policy
written thereunder; therefore, insolvency is tantamount to a denial of coverage, Rose did not receive what he had contracted for,
and the judgment of the circuit court should be affirmed.
THE HOLDING AND REASONING OF THE APPELLATE COURT

. The appellate court noted that at the time of the collision
between Rose and Jordan the only statute in effect was the 1963

Act concerning uninsured motor vehicle protection. 45 , That pro-

vision described the minimum limits of coverage in all liability
policies issued in the state unless rejected in writing by the insured. 46 But more significantly the provision did not define unin47
Sured motorist but left the definition to the individual policy.

The appellate court distinguished between the terms of the
earlier policies and later policies which provided for uninsured
motorist protection. The earlier policies defined uninsured motor
vehicle to include "one with respect to which there was no applicable liability policy. '' 48

In later policies the definition was ex-

,tended to include as an uninsured motor vehicle, "one with respect to:which such policy was applicable but coverage under such
policy was denied."' 4

These were the terms in the policy issued

by Illinois National:, (1) the total lack of applicable liability insurance or, (2) if. there was such insurance applicable, coverage
50
had been denied. ,

The appellate court rejected plaintiff-appellant's contention
that "a denial of coverage means and is limited to those affirmative acts of the insurer ... generally characterized as "policy defenses" and that the subsequent insolvency of the insurer is not
such an affirmative act."' 5 1

The appellate court recognized Pat-

tani I, which determined that "subsequent insolvency of a liability
.carrier didnot constitute a denial of coverage."' 52 However, the
court in Rose acknowledged that the decision was "reversed by
the highest court in Pennsylvania" 53 in Pattani II. The reasoning employed in PattaniII reflects the decisions in Brower, Gibson, and Katz that subsequent insolvency does constitute a denial
of coverage. Relying on those decisions the appellate court declared that the "insured's rights, with respect to protection which
the liability carrier has agreed to provide, are just as effectively
45 Rose, 93 Ill. App. 2d at 330, 235 N.E.2d at 676 (1968).
46 Id.

47Id.
48M.

"s
id.- --

-- - -

50 See text at note 12 supra.
51 Rose, 93 Ill. App. 2d at 331, 235 NE2d-at 67.7

d.
5 Id.
52

.'--

1968)_.

-7
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denied whether the insurer's conduct be voluntary or involun54
tary."
The appellate court pointed out that the 1967 amendment of
the Insurance Act 55 provides coverage for an insolvent insurer
but by its terms is prospective. Nevertheless, the meaning of the
policy which the court construed "is not and does not depend
upon a retroactive application of the amendment." 56 The court
declared: "[W] e have applied the generally established meaning
of the policy provision even though it is true that the precise
question would not have arisen had the amendment been in ef57
fect."
Thus the appellate court, independent of the prospectively
applicable amendment to the uninsured motorist provision, declared that the subsequent insolvency of a liability insurance carrier was a denial of coverage, as the term was used in an uninsured motorist provision.
CONCLUSION

The 1967 legislative enactment amending the 1963 Act in essence made the Rose decision moot, except where coverage had
been denied prior to the effective date of the amendment and included the denial of coverage clause.
The necessity of greater automobile insurance coverage is
exemplified by the legislative enactments and the judicial declarations of the insured's right to coverage from his insurer when the
tortfeasor or the tortfeasor's insurer cannot provide coverage.
The strength of Rose lies in the public's need for all inclusive protection - from the negligent driver and the insurer who contracts to provide coverage with such drivers. It also points out
the need for stronger safeguards to protect the unsuspecting public from the financially precarious insurer.
Lorence H. Slutzky

54 Id. at 332, 235 N.E.2d at 677.
55 Id. at 333, 235 N.E.2d at 677.
56 Id.
5 Id.

